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Theoria as Practice and as Activity1
Julie Ward
(Loyola University Chicago - Dept. of Philosophy)
Part One: Setting the Stage for Theoria
In Book X chapter 7 of Nicomachean Ethics (henceforth, EN), 
Aristotle reaches two decisive conclusions: first, the activity of our 
intellect which he terms θεωρία is the highest kind and comprises 
“complete happiness” (ἡ τελεῖα εὐδαίμονια, EN 1177a19); second, 
a theoretical life, being divine, counts as the highest, and is the one 
to aim at (EN 1178a5-7). These are compelling claims, rightly gen-
erating much scholarly comment, particularly about the balance 
of excellent theoretical and moral activity in the best human life.2 
Yet the present paper proposes to follow a different standard, one 
with a broader, thematic approach to θεωρία. My overall aim is 
to place Aristotle’s discussion against a wider backdrop of θεωρία 
as a long-standing practice of the classical Greek period, one that 
consists in travelling to specific religious sites, including Delphi, 
Olympia, Delos, and Eleusis, to name but a few, to observe rituals 
and performances. A natural question then arises concerning the 
reason for which Aristotle employs the same term as the practice. 
To provide an informed reply, we need to recount the features of 
theoria we find in the literary and historical sources, and compare 
them with Aristotle’s conception of it as the highest intellectual 
1 The author wishes to acknowledge the organizers of the conference “Ari-
stotele e le sfide del suo tempo,” held at Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in 
Milan, November 9-11, 2016, for the invitation to present this paper. I wish to 
direct special thanks to Prof. Nicoletta Scotti, Professor, Department of Philo-
sophy, for her assistance and support throughout; I also recognize the editorial 
staff of the present volume for their assistance. 
2 Among recent scholars, see, for example, Burger (1995), Ackrill (1980), 
Charles (1999), Cooper (1986), Hardie (1965), Kraut (1999), Richardson Lear 
(2004), Rorty (1980), Roche (1988).
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activity in EN X 7-8. While we find clear differences between the 
cultural practice and Aristotle’s use of the notion, we find specific 
features in common, such as that they involve visual spectatorship, 
and have a religious aim or a divine aspect. 
Let me make a few preliminary notes about terminology within 
the present paper. In its application throughout EN, the term θεω-
ρία is translated in English by “contemplation,” or “study,” which 
fail to reflect adequately the connection to the verb θεωρεῖν which 
involves visual perception—in contrast to the Italian term teoria 
which preserves the Greek root. So, throughout the paper I prefer 
using the transliterated term theoria instead of “contemplation.” 
A glance at the lexical entries for θεωρία, θεωρεῖν show that in its 
active sense, the verb signifies the activity of looking at or view-
ing something—as, for example, used of spectators at the athlet-
ic Games or at theatrical performances. This sense in English is 
rendered by specific verbs of seeing, such as “look at,” “behold,” 
“gaze”—all of which signify the act of looking at something, not 
merely seeing. The examples in the Greek lexicon show the term 
refers to the activity of observing something significant like a re-
ligious ritual or event, which implies that the perceptual activity 
involved is not to be confused with simple sense-perception, mere 
seeing. Now let us examine a few examples from classical literature 
where the terms θεωρία or θεωρεῖν occur. 
We begin with Herodotus, who, in giving an account of a journey 
that Solon made to Lydia and Egypt to learn about other cultures, 
describes his travels as a θεωρία (Hist. 1. 29-31). In this usage, θε-
ωρία refers to the practice of travelling for the sake of sight-seeing 
or exploration which consists of one or more cities visited (Ruther-
ford 2000, pp. 135-136; 2014, pp. 149-155). Another occurrence of 
theoria, one of the most frequently cited, is in connection to Alcib-
iades speaking before the Athenian assembly. According to Thu-
cydides, Alcibiades makes the report that: “Through the brilliance 
of my θεωρία to Olympia, other Greeks were led to believe our city 
greater than she really was” (Hist. 6, 16, 2). Alcibiades goes on to 
describe his multiple victories in chariot-racing, and his display of 
magnificence in the ceremonies of the festival.3 This case of θεω-
ρία has different characteristics than the first one. First, the event 
Alcibiades refers to as θεωρία – travelling to Olympia for the sake 
3 One scholar argues that Alcibiades’ actions of taking the state emblems 
and displaying them as his own at the festival was considered ostentatious and 
wholly improper (cf. Bill 1901, p. 200). 
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of attending the religious festival and athletic Games— is distinct 
from Solon’s general sight-seeing activity, although both involve 
seeing something significant. And Alcibiades’ case exemplifies the 
most common use of θεωρία, that of an established cultural prac-
tice in which a citizen of one city undertakes a trip to another as 
private citizen or as appointed ambassador for the sake of viewing 
some performance or spectacle. Thucydides gives us both kinds of 
travelling: the account of Alcibiades’ trip reflects travel as a private 
citizen, and in another, he describes an official delegation of Ioni-
ans going to the Delian Festival (Hist. 3. 101), a kind of reference 
that is not uncommon in Plato’s usage (e.g., Crito 43c9-d1, Phd. 
58b1-5, Rep. 556c10). 
A related usage occurs in Aristophanes’ play Peace in which we 
find a mute character called Theoria given back to the assembly 
as a gift of the character Peace (ll. 523 ff.). On one reading, the 
passage suggests that we see the character Peace as restoring the 
power of the boule to appoint ambassadors to the festivals that is 
broken by war, in which case the character, Theoria, represents the 
service of state delegates going to festivals (cf. Bill 1901, pp. 201-
202). We also find theoria being used, in a more esoteric context, 
to describe the particular viewing activity of the ordinary follower 
of the Eleusinian mysteries—in distinction from the viewing activ-
ity of the Eleusinian initiate, which is called epopteia (Rutherford 
2000, p. 139, n. 31). A further distinct reference to θεωρία arises 
from its mention in regard to the so-called Theoric Fund, which ap-
pears to have been established by Pericles for the purpose of allow-
ing poor Athenian citizens to attend the Dionysia festival in Athens 
in 5th and 4th centuries4 (Rutherford 2000, p. 134, n. 8).
On the basis of the brief sketch of the various contexts θεωρία 
appears in apart from its philosophical contexts, we can compile a 
list of the following uses: (i) an individual travelling for sightsee-
ing, or exploration; (ii) an individual travelling to a festival or sanc-
tuary for religious rituals or performances;5 (iii) a state-appoint-
ed delegate or delegation travelling to festivals or sanctuaries for 
said aims; (iv) an uninitiated observer of Eleusinian Mysteries—
to which list another scholar adds these lesser uses: (v) travelling 
to consult an oracle; (vi) travelling as an envoy to another city to 
4 Dates of the Fund vary, but a reasonable suggestion is 450 BCE - 326/23 
BCE; the fund is mentioned in Aristotle, Constitution of Athens. See Ruther-
ford (2000), p. 134, n. 8, Bill (1901), 201- 202. 
5 Those travelling to festivals may include women, children, and slaves, as 
well as male citizens (cf. Rutherford 2013, pp. 146, 160-161).
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announce a festival; (vii) travelling as a magistrate regularly em-
ployed by one’s city (Bill 1901, pp. 196-197). Although there exists 
a wide range of uses of θεωρία, let us consider whether some com-
mon features may not, after all, be found. The suggestion of taking 
the linked notions of viewing something significant and sacred duty 
as key features seems reasonable (Bill 1901, p. 197). These features 
are evident among the textual examples we find about individuals, 
or city-appointed ambassadors, travelling to festivals or shrines; 
however, they do not fare as well in those examples of sight-seeing 
or exploration, like what we find in Herodotus, where the notion 
of duty seems irrelevant. Thus, my proposal consists in modifying 
the two features to include the notion of viewing or spectatorship, 
with the object viewed being something highly significant or re-
ligious (e.g., an icon, ritual, shrine, or a foreign site). Taking this 
complex idea as the generic feature allows us to comprehend the 
various examples of θεωρία as practice including sightseeing and 
exploration as well as observing a sacred ritual, religious perfor-
mances, athletic Games, visiting a shrine. And from these cases, 
we also see connections to the lesser uses, such as being sent by 
one’s city to attend a festival, announce a festival, going to a site to 
consult an oracle. 
However, one key feature of the cultural practice remains un-
remarked in the previous account. What the element of viewing 
leaves out is the idea of undertaking a journey from one’s city to 
observe something significant and returning home, a feature that 
at least one recent scholar has found essential to the practice of 
θεωρία (Nightingale 2004, 40-71). The idea of this kind of travel 
suggests an analogy to pilgrimage (Rutherford 2014, pp. 12-16), an 
apt enough parallel if one allows for specific differences. For ex-
ample, in the practice of θεωρία, one may be travelling for any of 
several ends, such as attending festivals, religious rites, consult-
ing oracles, going to sacrifices, attending Games, seeking cures, or 
going sight-seeing. In contrast, travelling as pilgrimage compris-
es a narrowly defined end, say, travelling to a religious shrine or 
site with a single religious aim. Another difference with pilgrimage 
consists in the political aspect of θεωρία, namely, if one has been 
travelling as a city-appointed ambassador, one is expected to re-
turn to one’s city, and make a report to the city council. This aspect 
may be reflected in Alcibiades’ account of his trip to Olympia to the 
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Athenian assembly recounted in Thucydides (Hist. 6. 16. 2),6 and, 
at any rate, underscores the necessity to keep a certain conceptual 
distance between the ideas of pilgrimage and theoria. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, let us consider two elements 
as central to the notion of θεωρία: first, the idea of viewing, or spec-
tatorship, and second, that of undertaking a journey to observe 
something significant. At this point, we may ask whether there is 
some continuity with Aristotle’s discussion in EN X 7-8, where he 
describes θεωρία as the kind of thinking using the intellect (nous) 
that comprises the highest, most complete activity, human or di-
vine. At first glance, the similarity to the practice of θεωρία that we 
have been describing seems slight. For, Aristotle’s description of 
θεωρία in EN X 7 does not involve travelling to a religious festival 
or site to view a spectacle. Yet if we make a distinction between 
two kinds of looking, between inner and outer looking—or better, 
between mental and visual perception—we may find a foothold for 
grasping the common feature. To mention the central one, Aristot-
le’s θεωρία as intellectual activity reflects a kind of mental compre-
hension that implies a visual element, and in this regard, Aristot-
le’s use can be seen as an extension of the classical notion involving 
spectatorship. Whether the other element of undertaking a journey 
to somewhere and returning home can be discerned in Aristotle 
is complex, and falls somewhat outside the confines of this paper, 
although in the last section of the paper I suggest a certain parallel. 
Let us return to the main point: Aristotle’s use of the noun θε-
ωρία and verb θεωρεῖν covers a range of mental activities, as the 
English verbs in translation are seen to reflect: “contemplate,” 
“study,” “observe,” “consider,” “weigh,” and “theorize,” to name 
but a few. Additionally, there appears to be a difference in meaning 
between the noun and the verbal forms across his works. Specifi-
cally, the differences arise depending on whether the noun θεωρία 
or the verb θεωρεῖν is used: the noun always signifies the active 
exercise of intellectual vision, “contemplation”, while the verbal 
forms refer to the process of observing or investigating something. 
Additionally, these two main uses—that of θεωρία to signify “con-
templation” as well as θεωρεῖν to mean “to consider,” “to observe” 
(etc.)—are not Aristotle’s innovations but are inherited from Plato. 
In fact, Plato employs the term θεωρία in the older meanings, re-
ferring to the cultural practice of attending a festival, the festival 
6 The evidence suggests that Alcibiades was not acting as a city-appointed 
envoy, but as private citizen (cf. Bill 1901, pp. 200-201). 
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itself, or the delegation to the festival, as well as referring to the act 
of intellectual apprehension.7 But where Aristotle makes his dis-
tinctive mark in regard to θεωρία is his refinement of the notion: 
specifically, his description of it as an activity (energeia) and an 
activity of a specific kind, what he terms a “complete” activity. It is 
to Aristotle’s conception of θεωρία that we now turn our attention. 
Part Two: Theoria as Activity
As we have seen, Aristotle describes theoria in EN X as an “ac-
tivity,” or energeia, and so, the term requires some explanation as 
it is textually-dependent. For example, in Meta., Aristotle describes 
differences using the terms “activity” (energeia) vs. “motion” (ki-
nesis) whereas in EN, he chooses to contrast “activity” (energeia) 
vs. “disposition” (hexis).8 To begin, his description of energeia as 
being “at base motion” (Meta. IX 3, 1047a32) should be enlarged 
conceptually to accommodate an intellectual activity such as theo-
ria since its essence is wholly distinct from motions, or incomplete 
activities, like building or walking. In EN, when he describes theo-
ria as an activity (energeia), he means to distinguish it from a dis-
position (hexis) as well as from a potentiality (dunamis), a more re-
mote state. In fact, in EN Aristotle’s preferred contrastive concepts 
are energeia and hexis, rather than the broader concepts, energeia 
and dunamis. One reason for the regular appearance of the specific 
contrast of energeia – hexis may be traced to an interest in refuting 
Speusippus who is thought to have defined happiness as “a com-
plete disposition” (hexis teleia), and so set the terms of Aristotle’s 
exposition (Burnet 1900, p. 42). Whatever the reason, the contrast 
appears frequently in EN—as in EN I 1 and I 8—where Aristotle 
defines eudaimonia as an activity: it is “an activity (energeia) in 
accordance with virtue” (EN I 8, 1098b31). He explains that it mat-
7 For example, for Plato, theoria signifies variously: (i) contemplation, 
Gorgias 523e3-4, Republic 468a8; (ii) observation, Laws XII, 951c4; (iii) de-
legation, Rep. 556c10; (iv) festival, Laws I, 650a2; see E. Des Places (1970), 
pp. 252-253. 
8 Of four key Meta. passages on activity (ἐνέργεια), i.e., Meta. IX 3, IX 
6, IX, 8 and XI 9, three (Meta. IX 3, IX 8, XI 9) connect activity to motion, 
as, for example: “the term activity (ἐνέργεια) which is connected to full actua-
lity (ἐντελέχεια) has been extended to other things, especially from motions 
(κινήσεις), for activity (ἐνέργεια) seems especially to be motion” (δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ 
ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἡ κίνησις εἶναι), at Meta. IX 3 (1047a30-32).
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ters a great deal whether happiness is displayed in act (energeia) 
or merely possessed as a disposition (hexis, EN I 8, 1098b31-33). 
For, if the latter, Aristotle argues, it might not produce a good re-
sult, as with someone is asleep or incapacitated; so, eudaimonia 
must be defined as an activity, not merely as a disposition, for vir-
tue (1098b33-1099a3). In EN X 6, Aristotle repeats this line of rea-
soning: eudaimonia cannot be a dispositional state (hexis), for if it 
were, someone asleep or suffering deep misfortune could possess 
it (1176a34-35). As this conclusion is unacceptable (176a35-b1), he 
concludes that happiness must be counted as “a kind of activity” 
(energeian tina, 1176b1). So, happiness is placed in the category 
of activities. Yet we need to say more about activities (energeiai). 
Aristotle notes that there are two kinds of activities: one kind is 
necessary and desirable for the sake of something else, and another 
kind is desirable in itself. He concludes that happiness belongs to 
the latter kind (EN X 6, 1176b1-4).9 Happiness must belong to 
the second kind, the sort which is desirable in itself, since “it lacks 
nothing and is self-sufficient” (EN X 6, 1176a5-6). As we know from 
Aristotle’s discussion of happiness in EN I 7, something that is 
called “self-sufficient” (autarkes) means “something which taken 
by itself renders life desirable and lacking nothing” (EN 1097b15-
16). So, he concludes that happiness is just this sort of thing, de-
sirable in itself, lacking in nothing —a conclusion that supports his 
prior reasoning about the finality of happiness in EN I 7. Since the 
capstone argument in EN X 7 showing that theoria is identical to 
complete happiness (teleia eudaimonia, 1177a17, 1177b24) relies in 
good measure on his argument in EN I 7, let us return for the mo-
ment to this argument in EN I 7.
The argument Aristotle makes in EN I 7 (1097a30-b6) about 
happiness centers on the notion of what makes something final, or 
complete (teleion). We may set out the argument in expository form 
consisting of the following steps. First, he states: (1) the highest 
good (ariston) is something final (teleion), and if there are several 
final ends, happiness will be the one that is most final (teleiotaton). 
Second, he adds a two-pronged qualification: (2a) something pur-
sued as an end in itself is more final (teleioteron) than something 
pursued as a means to something else, and (2b) something never 
9 In his note at EN 1176b1-3, Burnet (1900, 459) observes the distinction 
between activities desirable in themselves and for the sake of something else 
does not preclude activities being both desirable in themselves and for so-
mething else; cf. EN 1096b17. 
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chosen as a means to anything else is more final (teleioteron) than 
something chosen both for itself and as a means to something else. 
10 Next, he draws a preliminary conclusion: (3) something always 
chosen as an end, and never as a means, is “absolutely final” (hap-
los teleion), (EN 1097a33). He reasons that happiness seems to be 
just this thing, something chosen for its own sake and never as a 
means to anything else (EN 1097a34). In contrast, ends like honor, 
pleasure, and the virtues are chosen for themselves, but also for 
the sake of happiness (EN I 7, 1097b2-4). So, he confirms the con-
clusion from 1097a33: (4) since happiness is chosen for itself alone 
and never as a means to anything else, this is the most final thing, 
and it is final in the unqualified, or absolute sense (haplos teleion, 
1097a33-1097b1). So, in the course of the “completeness” argu-
ment, we see that things may be chosen partly for themselves and 
partly for the sake of something else, but happiness stands alone in 
being always chosen for itself and not for the sake of anything else. 
Therefore, happiness alone deserves to be called “absolutely” (hap-
los) final (teleion). Using the logic of being complete, or teleion, 
that he has set down in EN I 7, Aristotle has secured part of what 
he needs to draw the conclusion in EN X 7 that establishes theoria 
as complete happiness (teleian eudaimonia). The other part of his 
argument is provided by his discussion of pleasure, and more spe-
cifically, about complete activities, in EN X 4 and X 5. 
Part Three: Complete and Incomplete Activity
Aristotle employs the idea of happiness as being something 
“absolutely complete” (haplos teleion) in EN I 7 to argue toward 
his conclusion that theoria is complete happiness in EN X 7. He 
reaches this conclusion by means of two pivotal conclusions from 
EN X 4 and X 5. The first proposition involves drawing a distinc-
tion between “complete” and “incomplete” activity. The second re-
sults from the first: theoria is placed in the category of “complete” 
activity. To begin, let us sketch the differences between complete 
and incomplete activity: an incomplete activity has its end external 
to the activity, as in the case of building something or healing a 
patient. In the case of healing, Aristotle tells us, the end of heal-
10 I suggest we call the proposition the “Principle of Finality” (PF); it is 
used here in relation to ranking ends we desire and choose, but it also crops up 
in EN X 7 in ranking kinds of activities, moral and intellectual. 
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ing as an activity is health (cf. EN I 1, 1094a8). So, its constitutive 
elements—using a cutting or purging procedure, for example—are 
done for something different from the procedure, namely, for the 
sake of health. We have a similar analysis, he claims, in building a 
temple: the constitutive elements—such as laying the foundation, 
fluting the stone, and fitting the columns (cf. EN X 4, 1174a23-27)—
are done for the sake of the temple, not for their own sake. Although 
we might agree that in regard to specific parts of the activity, such as 
fluting a column, the activity and the end seem to coincide. However, 
considered as a part, the fluting activity is done for the sake of mak-
ing the temple, not for its own sake. So, in we see that such kinds of 
activity, the end of the activity is external to the activity itself. And 
Aristotle tells us that such activities are called “motions” and are “in-
complete” (ateles, EN X 4, 1174a22). As Aristotle states in De Anima 
II 5, “motion is a form of activity, but incomplete” (DA 417a16-17).11 
There is also another kind of activity, however, and this sort is 
termed “complete” (teleia). This kind has its end contained in the 
activity itself, not in anything outside the activity—as we saw with 
healing or building a temple. As examples of this kind, Aristotle 
specifically mentions the activity of seeing or any of other four 
modes of special sense-perception (hearing, smelling, touching, 
tasting): each one comprises “complete” (teleia) activity (EN X 4, 
1174a15). In fact, Aristotle mentions three central features of “com-
plete” activities in EN X 4. First, the activity contains its end—just 
in the sense that the activity itself constitutes the goal of the activ-
ity. We may grasp this feature by contrasting it with the example 
of building a temple: the activity of building is done for the sake of 
something else, a temple. The second feature of “complete” activity 
is that it lacks temporal duration: such activity is not extended in 
time, but something whole (holon) at each moment. The third fea-
ture concerns that the form specific to defining the activity is fully 
present, and needs nothing to complete it (EN X 4, 1174a15-18). 
But what does it mean to say that an activity (energeia) is “for-
mally” complete? We may grasp this feature best by considering 
the activity of special sense-perception as it is described in De An-
ima II 5 and II 12. First, the activity of sense-perception in general 
is defined as the active exercise of a sense capacity (DA II 5, 417b16-
19). And in DA II 12, he argues that sense-perception consists in 
“apprehending the form of the sensible thing without the matter” 
11 Also Phys. III 2, 201b31: “… motion appears to be an activity (energeia) 
but incomplete” (ateles).
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(DA 412b17-18). For example, in the case of seeing, the sense of 
sight grasps the sensible form of some colored object present (cf. 
DA II 7, 418a29-31); as a result, we can say that we are visual-
ly aware. The act of visual apprehension—say, seeing a shade of 
blue—is not temporally extended but takes place all at once. We 
apprehend the sensible form, a ratio, of a particular sensible in its 
entirety. In this respect, one may say that the activity of sensing is 
“complete in each moment.” In fact, any specific episode of active 
perceiving, namely, seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, or smelling, 
is “complete” in the sense that its essential feature is present at 
each moment, and so, it is a whole. This account from DA (and DS) 
is in full agreement with the passage in EN X 4 where he character-
izes seeing as a “complete” activity: seeing is non-temporal, taking 
place in a moment (cf. EN X 4, 1174b8). 
To sum up, in EN X 4, Aristotle distinguishes complete from 
incomplete activities. The latter kind include building, healing, 
moving from one place to another—all these comprise what he 
terms “motions” (kineseis, EN X 4,1174a19). As he explains the no-
tion in EN X 4: “All motion takes time, and is for some end, like 
housebuilding, and is complete only when it accomplishes what it 
aims at” (EN X 4, 1174a19-21). In other words, building a house or 
healing a patient are comprised of various subordinate activities, 
each one with a different nature. As he notes in EN X 4, building a 
temple consists in, among other things, laying a foundation, fitting 
the stones, fluting the columns, making the triglyph, and so on. 
And none of these individual components comprises the end: each 
one is only a part (EN X 4, 1174a23-26). So, the whole comprised of 
the component parts is incomplete (ateles) activity (EN 1174a22). 
As he explains, “these motions differ in form,” and “no motion is 
complete at any given moment” (EN X 4,1174a21-22). So, although 
motions, like building a house or healing a person, are activities in 
the larger sense of being present exercises of an ability, they are 
“incomplete” activities in the three ways specified: (i) having an 
end outside the activity; (ii) possessing temporal duration; (iii) 
lacking a complete form. So, activities such as healing or building 
differ in kind when compared with perceptual activities like see-
ing or hearing, or with intellectual activities like dianoia-reasoning 
or theoria-thinking. To be more precise, the features pertaining to 
seeing also pertain to dianoia and theoria, namely: (i) being a com-
plete activity, (ii) being something whole, (iii) having its form is 
complete at each moment, and (iv) lacking temporal duration (cf. 
EN X 4, 1174a14-19, 1174b5-7). 
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Part IV: Theoria as Complete Activity
Aristotle’s idea of complete activity developed in EN X 4 fits 
seamlessly with his notion of happiness as an activity in EN X 6: all 
of the conceptual connections from EN I 7 remains fresh as he be-
gins his discussion of theoria in EN X 7. What changes is that in EN 
X 7 he brings the idea of a complete activity to its highest human 
expression—to its most elevated occurrence, namely, the activity of 
study, or theoria. In EN X 7, he begins the discussion of theoria by 
introducing it as the activity of our best, or highest, faculty (aris-
ton), (EN 1177a13). He suggests it is our intellect (nous) or “the part 
that rules us and gives us ideas of what it noble and divine” (EN 
1177a14-15). Next, he states: “whether this is divine or the most di-
vine in us,” it is “the activity of this part in accordance with virtue 
that comprises complete happiness (teleia eudaimonia), (EN X 7, 
1177a15-17), adding that this activity is to be identified with the the-
oretical kind (he theoretike), (EN X 7, 1177a17-18). At this point in 
the chapter, we see where Aristotle is heading with his equation of 
theoria and complete happiness (teleia eudaimonia, 1177a17), yet 
here he establishes the proof of the connection by appeal to human 
faculties without mentioning the gods directly. As was noted, the 
argument in EN X 7 begins by stating that theoria is the activity of 
the “highest,” or “best,” part of us, our intellect, which is the part 
that “gives us ideas of the noble and the divine” (EN X 7, 1177a13-
15). He then gives no fewer than six arguments recommending the 
activity of theoria as the highest activity, and thus, identical with 
happiness (cf. EN X 7, 1177a15-b25). But throughout EN X 7 pas-
sage, he employs metaphysical arguments based on human—not 
divine—capacities and ways of knowing. 
The arguments in EN X 7 showing theoria to be the highest of 
human activities include: (1) theoria is the highest activity since it 
belongs to the highest part, intellect, and (2) this part apprehends 
the most knowable objects (EN 1177a20-21). Theoria is next ar-
gued to be complete happiness on the grounds that: (3) it is the 
“most continuous” activity (sunechestate), (EN 1177a21); (4) of all 
virtuous activities, that of theoria is the most pleasant (1177a23-
25); (5) the activity of theoria is the most self-sufficient (1177a27-
28); and (6) theoria alone is loved for its own sake, not for the sake 
of anything else (1177b1-2). These arguments provide us with the 
central features of theoria, including that: it is an activity of the in-
tellect (nous, 1177a14-15); being theoretical, it comprises the high-
est activity (1177a19-21, 1177b19); it aims at nothing beyond itself; 
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it is continuous (suneches,1177a21);12 it is most pleasant (1177a23-
25); it is self-sufficient (autarkes); it is leisurely (scholastikon); it 
is free from fatigue (atruton, 1177b21-22). It is worth pointing out 
that all the arguments in EN X 7 are based on the nature of human 
theoria; none promote theoria on the grounds of it being similar to 
the gods’ activity.13 However, his argument about theoria is not yet 
complete: he moves upwards, from considering human happiness 
in EN X 7 to divine happiness in EN X 8. 
V. EN X 8: Theoria as Divine Activity
Aristotle opens the connection between theoria and gods’ ac-
tivity in EN X 8. His move is predictable given what is in effect a 
theoretical line of ascent from EN X 4 culminating at EN X 8. In 
effect, he moves away from considering theoria as a human activ-
ity to that of comparing two lives, one of moral virtue, the other 
of study. The authoritative argument for the superiority of theoria 
depends on showing what is proper to gods is the activity of study, 
not of moral virtue. In this way, he brings in the activity of the gods 
as a means of comparing theoria and excellent moral activity, then 
concluding that the latter comprises a secondary kind of happiness 
(EN X 8, 1178a9-10). And yet, the way in which he reaches the fa-
miliar conclusion deserves some note. Let us examine the argu-
ment more closely. In EN X 8, he argues in an eliminative fashion: 
the gods are active living beings but since it is not proper to them 
to engage in moral activity, the only activity remaining is theoria 
(EN X 8, 1178b21). And he concludes: “So, the activity (energeia) 
of the gods that is the most blessed (makarios) is theoretical (theo-
retike); and the human activity most akin to it is the happiest” (EN 
X 8, 1178b21-23). Furthermore, since the activities of theoria and 
eudaimonia are co-extensive (1178b28-29), the more theoretical 
12 On the “continuity” accorded study: “we are able to think more conti-
nuously (sunechestate) than we are able to perform any action” (EN 1177a21-
22); the suggestion that theoria is “most continuous” concerns its being an 
activity of a non-composite faculty, the intellect, seems reasonable (Gauthier 
and Jolif, T. II, p. 879). As well, it may relate to the comment about activities 
being more and less complete depending on object and condition of faculty, 
EN X 4, 1174b21-23. 
13 Although the first argument mentions theoria as being the highest due 
to the objects of thought being “noble and divine” (EN 1177a15), the term refers 
to a property of human ideas. 
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activity one engages in, the happier one will be (1178b29-30). So, 
for humans, “happiness is a kind of theoria” (he eudaimonia the-
oria tis, EN 1178b32). The argument may be expanded as follows:
(1) Among living things, only gods and humans share in the ac-
tivity of happiness (1178b26-27).
(2) Among the activities comprising happiness, humans share 
in moral and in theoretical activity. 
(3) The gods share in theoretical activity but not in moral activ-
ity (1178b20-21).
(4) The activity of the gods that comprises their happiness is 
theoretical (1178b21-22).
(5) The human activity most like divine activity comprises the 
highest human happiness (1178b23-24).
(6) Therefore, theoretical activity comprises the highest human 
happiness (1178b7-b32). 
As a start, we need to examine the pivotal premise of the ar-
gument (premise 3) about the gods’ activities along with its sup-
porting argument, given that the premise is crucial to inferring the 
conclusion (premise 6). Here it should be noted that the argument 
that Aristotle gives to support premise 3 (at EN 1178b8-b18) is in-
direct and contains rhetorical elements. First, this argument is in-
direct in the sense that it does not prove that gods do not engage 
in moral activity based on a premise about their nature: there is 
no reference to the essential properties of the gods here. Rather, 
the argument employs rhetorical questions to indicate that gods 
do not share in moral activity because they have no such needs. 
Specifically, after stating that gods are “most happy and blessed” 
(EN 1178b8-9), he asks: 
But what kinds of actions are we to attribute to them? Acts of 
justice? Will they not seem ridiculous making contracts with one 
another, returning deposits and so forth? Perhaps acts of courage—
withstanding fearful things and taking risks because it is noble to 
do so? Or generous actions? But to whom will they give? … If we 
went through the whole list, we would see that a concern with ac-
tions is petty and unworthy of the gods (EN X 8, 1178b10-b18).14
In this way, he implies that the need to exercise a moral virtue 
is inconsistent with the gods’ natures and consequently with their 
happiness: more specifically, gods have no need for justice, courage, 
moderation or other moral virtues as they are “most blessed” (EN 
14 Tr. M. Ostwald (1999). 
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1178b8-9). Being concerned with practical actions itself reflects a 
“smallness” that is “unworthy” of the gods (EN X 8, 1178b17-18). 
We can also obtain the conclusion that gods have no need to en-
gage in moral actions by reference to Aristotle’s distinction between 
complete and incomplete activities. Let us assume that in virtue of 
their essence, gods engage in complete activities only, and if there is 
more than one such activity, in the most complete. Recall that Aris-
totle’s baseline for an activity being complete concerns the end and 
the activity being the same, it being impossible to have a distinct end 
of a “complete” activity. However, excellent moral activity is desired 
for its own sake and also for the sake of something else. As Aristo-
tle notes: “We derive a greater or smaller advantage from practical 
pursuits beyond the action itself…” (EN X 8, 1177b2-4), than offering 
examples of such advantages. First, in military actions that involve 
courage, the advantage is victory—for, as he notes, “no one chooses 
to wage war for the sake of war” (EN X 8, 1177b9-10). Second, in po-
litical actions, the advantage is political power or prestige; thus, all 
these actions are also performed for ends other than the activity it-
self (EN 1177b12-15). Although military and political actions surpass 
others in terms of nobility, they are un-leisurely, aim at ends outside 
themselves, not being chosen for their own sake (EN X 7, 1177b16-
18). Since gods only engage in complete activity, or the most com-
plete activity, it follows that gods do not engage in excellent moral 
activity. But if a more complete kind of activity exists, this would not 
be inconsistent with gods’ nature. 
As we know, there is a more complete activity, namely, theoria. 
Contrasted with moral activity where we derive some advantage, 
he says: “we derive nothing from the activity of studying” (to theo-
resai, EN 1177b4). In the list of the familiar features of theoria, let 
me emphasize its completeness, its aiming at nothing beyond the 
activity. In contrast, excellent moral activity is chosen partly for its 
own sake, and also for the sake of some other end, e.g., a military 
or political end. Such an activity is not as final as one chosen for 
itself and not for the sake of anything else. Aristotle introduces this 
proposition—let me call it the Principle of Finality (PF)—in EN I 
7. According to the text, from the perspective of completeness, one 
activity is more complete (teleion) than another if it is chosen for a 
single end. So, if there is an activity that is chosen for itself and not 
for the sake of anything else, this activity will be what is “absolutely 
complete” (haplos teleia). Aristotle tells us there is such an activity, 
and it is theoria, or study. Therefore, the activity the gods engage 
in must be theoria as this activity is the most complete, always be-
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ing chosen for itself. And since happiness is initially agreed to be 
an activity, this activity will comprise the happiness that the gods 
are said to enjoy. While Aristotle is not unaware that looking to 
the gods for the best activity sets a high bar for us—as he concedes 
“such a life (bios) would be more than human” (EN X 7, 1177b26-
27)—this admission does not diminish the uniqueness of the high-
est activity. From a perspective acknowledging our composite na-
ture, he agrees that we cannot engage in theoria continuously: we 
cannot live a life of theoria. Nonetheless, he recommends theoria 
as an aspirational goal, stating in the next lines: “we should try to 
become immortal as far as possible, and to do all we can to live ac-
cording with what is best in us” (EN X 7, 1177b33-34). So, Aristotle 
endorses theoria as the activity at which to aim, even if it cannot 
comprise a full human life—a life which, we should have no doubt, 
will include excellent moral activity and other good things.15 
We have seen that Aristotle’s affirmation of theoria as the high-
est human activity is connected to his prior reasoning about plea-
sure and complete activities, like seeing, in EN X 4. This line of 
discussion describes an ascent, beginning in EN X 4 and stretch-
ing to EN X 7, where Aristotle reaches the sub-conclusion that the 
highest human activity is theoria. This conclusion, in turn, pro-
vides a foothold for the highest point of his conception: an argu-
ment showing theoria is the activity of the gods in EN X 8. Having 
reached a pinnacle in his reasoning about the highest activity, he 
descends, the final passage comprising a rhetorical return to the 
starting point of the Ethics. In closing, he acknowledges “the end is 
not to study (to theoresai) and know (to gnonai) particular things 
to be done but to do them” (EN X 9, 1179a35-b2).16 Taking the 
whole work as an architectural model, we can conceive a circular 
shape formed throughout the Ethics in the sense that his final lines 
about the practical sciences and the art of politics return to the idea 
offered in EN I 6: that we seek the practical and not the theoretical 
good. We might imagine a parallel to the path of a classical Greek 
travelling on a theoria –moving away from and back to one’s home 
city—for the sake of seeing things occasioning wonder and leading 
to understanding. 
15 In fact, the argument has been made that being a good person, or having 
moral excellence, is the only way in which one is able to perform complete 
activities, like study: see C. Olfert, 2014. 
16 For the familiar claim about seeking the practical, not the theoretical, 
good, see EN I 6 (1096b35-1097a13), EN VI 7 (1141b5-23, passim.). 
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